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Abstract
A prosocial action typically provides a more sizable benefit when directed at those who have less as opposed to those
who have more. However, not all prosocial acts have a direct bearing on socioeconomic disadvantage, nor does disadvantage
necessarily imply a greater need for the prosocial outcome. Of interest here, welfare impact may depend on the number of
beneficiaries but not on their socioeconomic status. Across four preregistered studies of life-saving decisions, we demonstrate
that when allocating resources, many people are benevolently partial. That is, they choose to help the disadvantaged even
when this transparently implies sacrificing lives. We suggest that people construct prosocial aid as an opportunity to correct
morally aversive inequalities, thus making relatively more disadvantaged recipients a more justifiable target of help. Benevolent
partiality is reduced when people reflect beforehand on what aspects they will prioritize in their donation decision.
Keywords: prosocial preferences, altruism, consequentialism, distributive justice, inequality
1 Introduction
How should people decide whom to help? Consequential-
ist traditions in philosophy suggest that priority should be
given to the causes that provide the largest benefit to the
largest number of people. Most vocally, the Effective Al-
truism movement urges altruists to use evidence and reason
to evaluate alternative charitable projects, and, all else be-
ing equal, to donate to charities that benefit more people
as opposed to fewer (e.g., MacAskill, 2015; Pummer &
MacAskill, 2019; Singer, 2015). Building on these proposi-
tions, many charity-rating organizations (e.g., GiveWell) de-
velop high-level metrics that are valid across different coun-
tries or charity-specific goals, often expressing the efficiency
of donations in terms of number of lives saved (e.g., cost to
avert the death of an under-5 individual).
Underlying these efforts is the fundamental view that ev-
eryone counts as one. Consequentialists, as well the founda-
tional documents of intergovernmental organizations, typi-
cally conceive human lives as having equal value, irrespec-
tive of characteristics such as gender, race, or socioeconomic
status (e.g., Bentham, 1789; Mill, 1861; Parfit, 1978; Pum-
mer & MacAskill, 2019; Singer, 2015; UN General Assem-
bly, 1948). This does not negate that recipients’ characteris-
tics can be relevant to evaluate the impact of aid. However,
from this perspective, recipients’ characteristics are relevant
to the extent that they translate into heightened need for help,
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and not because they grant a special moral status to recip-
ients. Of particular relevance to the present paper, most
consequentialist traditions concur that aid is more benefi-
cial when directed at reducing socioeconomic disadvantage.
However, this is contingent on aid being directed at reducing
disadvantage, or on disadvantage generally increasing the
need for aid.
In this paper, we study how people’s preferences for proso-
cial aid respond to the socioeconomic disadvantage of recip-
ients when the consequential impact of aid does not depend
on recipients’ socioeconomic conditions. Across four pre-
registered studies, we demonstrate that a substantial number
of people have preferences for aid that are characterized by
benevolent partiality. That is, when choosingwhere to direct
prosocial aid between recipients with different background
socioeconomic conditions, people help the more disadvan-
taged recipients more than what the disadvantage implies
from a consequentialist viewpoint. In our studies, partici-
pants express their preference for seeing a number of lives
saved from a disadvantaged country or a larger number of
lives saved from a slightly less disadvantaged country. Con-
trary to the impartiality principle (e.g., Kahane et al., 2017;
Pummer & MacAskill, 2019; Singer, 2015), a plurality of
people prefers the former option, i.e., saving fewer lives than
they could. We suggest that benevolent partiality is driven by
distributive justice concerns. In particular, people prefer to
help disadvantaged others not only because such recipients
need more help, but also because they construct this action
as a way to compensate for previously existing inequalities.
In the remainder of the article, we discuss how the impact
of prosocial giving on welfare can be understood using the
lenses of consequentialist ethics, and why people’s prefer-
ences for aid might not align with consequentialist prescrip-
tions. We then present four studies that show how people
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resolve the trade-off between efficiency (i.e., benefiting more
people, in line with consequentialist ethics) and compensa-
tion (i.e., benefiting those who have relatively less, in line
with distributive concerns).
2 Socioeconomic Conditions and the
Efficiency of Help
Asmany activists warn, eliminating poverty is a global prior-
ity. Despite persistent economic improvement in the poorest
regions of the world, about 1/10 of the world population
lives below the poverty line of $1.90 per day (World Bank,
2018). Significantly, in 2015 the United Nations placed “No
Poverty” as number 1 among the Sustainable Development
Goals to achieve by 2030. Consequentialists, and Effective
Altruists in particular, are no exception in arguing that alle-
viating disadvantage is one of the most impactful investment
of prosocial resources (e.g., Singer, 2015).
From a consequentialist point of view, the overall impact
of a prosocial act can be understood as a function of the
size of the benefit provided and the number of beneficiaries
(Pellegrino, 2017). The size criterion to evaluate impact
posits that one should invest towards causes that bring a
larger benefit. For example, the same money could be raised
to fulfill a child’s wish to be Batkid for a day or to save the
life of a child who may die from malaria. Because a child’s
life is a more sizable benefit than a child’s wish coming
true, donating towards malaria prevention is consequentially
preferable (Singer, 2015). The number criterion posits that
given a benefit of a certain size (e.g., saving a life), one
should invest towards causes that benefit more people.
The socioeconomic condition of alternative recipients is
often relevant to assess the consequential impact of aid. First
and foremost, the size of the benefit that a monetary dona-
tion provides is often a direct function of the recipients’
socioeconomic situation. In particular, donating to poorer
recipients provides a larger benefit than donating to less poor
recipients. In classic utilitarianism, this is true because the
marginal utility of wealth is decreasing (e.g., Banerjee&Du-
flo, 2011; Diener & Biswas-Diener, 2002; Diener & Oishi,
2000). All else being equal, it is more beneficial to donate
$100 to a poor family that would use it for survival than
to a less poor family that would use it for recreational ac-
tivities (MacAskill, 2015; Singer, 2015). Socioeconomic
disadvantage is also important in prioritarianism, a variant
of utilitarianism which ascribes a greater weight to increas-
ing the welfare of those at lower welfare levels, independent
of the marginal utility of wealth (e.g., Parfit, 2012).
Second, even if prosocial aid does not aim at alleviating
disadvantage, socioeconomic conditions may be relevant to
the extent that they correlate with access to the specific form
of aid which is provided. Charities that distribute toys for
children, for instance, do not aim at improving socioeco-
nomic conditions; however, it is still sensible to donate toys
to children of poor families, because poor families likely
have less ability to acquire toys on their own. In sum, con-
sequentialism provides a compelling argument for directing
aid towards alleviating disadvantage, and generally empha-
sizes that the same outcome might provide a larger benefit
to disadvantaged recipients.
However, not all prosocial acts have direct bearing on dis-
advantage, nor does disadvantage necessarily imply a greater
need for the specific outcome that aid is trying to achieve.
For example, several charitable projects (e.g., in malaria pre-
vention) are explicitly trying to save lives. Number of lives
saved is also a metric used by GiveWell in their efforts to
quantify and equate the benefits of donating towards alterna-
tive heterogeneous causes. The rationale for relying on lives
saved as an outcome, other than its obvious importance, is
the presumably defendable principle of “impartiality”: peo-
ple’s lives, or at least quality-adjusted life years (e.g., Singer
et al., 1995), should be valued equally, irrespective of peo-
ple’s characteristics (e.g., gender, race, socioeconomic sta-
tus), and in accordance with the tenet “everybody to count
for one, nobody for more than one” (Bentham, 1789; Ka-
hane et al., 2017; Singer, 1993).1 That is, consequentialism
suggests that one should not attribute increased priority to
saving the life of any specific individual per se. A prosocial
action, such as a donation towards aid, is assumed to be more
beneficial when it allows saving more lives, irrespective of
the socioeconomic situation of the people who are saved.
3 Benevolent Partiality
Several research streams suggest that people’s preferences
about which lives to save might not be always impartial.
First, people do not always choose whom to help based
on consequentialist considerations. Berman and colleagues
(2018) demonstrated that people’s donation decisions are
less sensitive than investing decisions to cost-effectiveness
arguments. When evaluating donation opportunities, peo-
ple are often influenced by normatively irrelevant factors,
such as whether victims are beautiful (Cryder, Botti & Si-
monyan, 2017) or identifiable (Small, Loewenstein & Slovic,
2007). People are also overly sensitive to statistics such as
the number of dead people in disasters (Evangelidis & Van
den Bergh, 2013) or overhead expenses (Gneezy, Keenan
& Gneezy, 2014). Whereas previous research documented
instances in which prosocial preferences respond to conse-
quentially irrelevant factors, it does not directly show viola-
tions of impartiality. In fact, as explained by Berman and
colleagues (2018), most documented failures to maximize
1In an interview with the authors, a research analyst at GiveWell con-
firmed our account.
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welfare tend to become weaker when people can directly
compare alternative donation opportunities.
We believe, however, that socioeconomic differences be-
tween alternative recipients may exert a particularly strong
influence on people’s preferences for aid. A large amount of
research shows that most people are averse to socioeconomic
inequality. In the United States, for instance, many people
appear to desire more redistribution, more egalitarian poli-
cies, and a generally more equal society (e.g., Engelmann
& Strobel, 2004; Kiatpongsan & Norton, 2014; Norton &
Ariely, 2011). This tendency is deeply rooted in people’s
moral intuitions about fairness. Psychologically, people of-
ten prefer equitable resource distributions, i.e., with people
rewarded (“output”) based on their contributions (“input”;
e.g., Adams, 1965; Cook & Hegtvedt, 1993; Skitka & Tet-
lock, 1992). When inputs are perceived as equal, or there
is little indication that inputs may differ, a distribution is
deemed as just to the extent that outputs are equal (e.g.,
Mitchell et al., 1993). Importantly, people’s aversion to
inequitable allocations of resources can lead to sacrifice ef-
ficiency (i.e., total output) in order to benefit different par-
ties equally (see Gordon-Hecker et al., 2017 for a review).
For instance, beliefs that differences in income and wealth
depend on external circumstances more than on individual
effort translate into distress with existing inequalities, and
preferences for redistributive policies (e.g., Alesina & An-
geletos, 2005; Benabou & Tirole, 2006; Fong, 2001; Frank,
Wertenbroch & Maddux, 2015).
In this work, we test how distributive justice concerns in-
fluence decisions about prosocial aid that do not affect, and
are not consequentially affected, by recipients’ background
socioeconomic conditions. To clarify, we do not test whether
people prefer resource allocations that are more equitable al-
though less efficient: we test whether aid decisions prioritize
those in worse background conditions (i.e., compensation)
despite the inefficiency of the resulting allocation and the
irrelevance of such conditions for the aid they provide. In
other words, people choose between (1) efficient outcomes
(i.e., more lives saved) and (2) compensatory outcomes that
are less efficient (i.e., fewer lives saved) and not more equi-
table (because background conditions are unaffected).
Note that this trade-off may often apply to choices about
aid, because of the geographical distance between those who
provide help (frequently residing in Western societies) and
those who need help. Given the type of help that is provided,
people who are in worse socioeconomic conditions (e.g., in
the developing world) tend to be those who are costlier to
help (e.g., due to shipping costs; Li, Colby & Fernbach,
2018). It is thus important to understand how people rea-
son about helping alternative recipients. In this paper, we
are interested in the extent to which people’s preference for
giving to those who have the least are compensatory rather
than consequentialist, and label this preference benevolent
partiality: In our studies, participants who donate to those
who are more disadvantaged behave as if lives had different
value (a seeming violation of the impartiality principle); they
do so in a benevolent attempt to compensate for distributions
that they deem unjust.
4 Overview of Studies
We conducted four preregistered studies (plus three studies
reported in the Supplementary Material) to investigate peo-
ple’s preferences for saving the lives of people in low but
varying socioeconomic conditions.
In Study 1, participants chose which of two real charities
they wanted the experimenters to donate $100 to, expressing
the impact of such charities in terms of number of lives saved.
We find that emphasizing socioeconomic status increases
people’s preferences for saving the lives of statistically more
disadvantaged recipients, even if this implies saving fewer
lives.
In the following studies, we investigated the presence
benevolent partiality using scenarios that rule out conse-
quentialist reasons to give to the more disadvantaged (e.g.,
socioeconomic status covarying with access to alternative
forms of help), and confirm that people construct this situa-
tion as a compensation-efficiency trade-off. In Study 2A, we
demonstrate that choices of aid allocation are more difficult
to take when saving more lives implies saving those who are
slightly more socioeconomically disadvantaged. In Study
2B, we find that saving the lives of the more disadvantaged
is constructed as an opportunity to correct inequalities that
are deem unjust.
Finally, in Study 3, we tested whether the presence of
benevolent partiality depends on whether people reflected
on the relative importance of different choice criteria prior
to choosing between alternative charities. We find that this
additional step, which is recommended in normative models
of decision-making (e.g., Bazerman & Moore, 2008), re-
sults in choices that are more in line with consequentialist
prescriptions.
All the four studies were preregistered. We report all the
experimental conditions and the measures that we collected.
Studies were conducted with participants recruited online,
following best practices in online data collection (Goodman
& Paolacci, 2017). We compensated participants with the
equivalent of about $9/hour. All stimuli are presented in the
SupplementaryMaterial. Preregistrations, data, and analysis
codes are available at: https://osf.io/js2fq.
5 Study 1: Benevolent Partiality
Study 1 provides an initial demonstration that people are
more likely to prefer causes that benefit recipients that are in
worse socioeconomic conditions, even if doing so reduces
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the consequential impact of their donation (i.e., the num-
ber of lives saved). This study was preregistered (https://
aspredicted.org/j8tb4.pdf).
5.1 Method
5.1.1 Participants and Procedure
Participants were 304 US residents recruited from Amazon
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) with 95%+ approval rate (45.7%
female, mean age = 39.4). The study used a two-condition
between-participants design.
At the beginning of the study, participants were told that
the experimenters would donate $100 to a charity at the
end of data collection. We explained to participants that
they would indicate their preferred charity between two, the
Schistosomiasis Control Initiative (SCI) and The END Fund
(END), both delivering treatments for neglected tropical dis-
eases. We clarified that the experimenters would donate the
$100 to the charity receiving more preferences across all par-
ticipants. To ensure participants knew that they were making
a real decision, we provided them with a link to the webpage
where we later published the receipt of our $100 donation.
Similar to what donors do while considering alternative
projects on charity rating websites or Cause Marketing plat-
forms (e.g., AmazonSmile), participants read some infor-
mation about the two charities. Critically, we included
cost-effectiveness information retrieved from http://www.
givewell.org, i.e., the amount of money needed from the
charity to avert the death of an individual under 5 years old.
Given that this amount is lower for SCI ($1,100) than for
END ($2,500), donating to SCI would allow for a larger
impact in terms of lives saved than donating to END.
In a between-participants design, we manipulated the per-
ceived socioeconomic differences between potential recipi-
ents of the donation. In particular, we mentioned that END
collaborated with Ethiopia and that SCI collaborated with
Nigeria, and varied how such countries were described. In
the control condition, we described each country as “one
of the countries with the lowest Human Development In-
dex”. In the disadvantage condition, we provided informa-
tion about the annual GDP per capita and the literacy rate
of both countries. Because these indicators were better for
Nigeria ($1,990, 60%) than for Ethiopia ($870, 49%), we rea-
soned that participants in the disadvantage condition would
perceive Ethiopia to be more disadvantaged (than Nigeria)
compared to participants in the control condition.
After reading the information, participants selected the
charity they wanted experimenters to donate to (“Which
charity do you want us to donate the $100 to?”). As a
manipulation check, participants indicated which country
between Ethiopia and Nigeria was more disadvantaged on
a 7-point scale (1= Ethiopia, 7 = Nigeria). Additionally, in
a comprehension check, participants indicated whether SCI
or END was more effective (“Based on the information you
were given, which charity gets the bigger bang out of the
buck? That is, which charity is more cost-effective?”).
5.2 Results
The disadvantage manipulation was successful: Relative to
Nigeria, Ethiopia was perceived as more disadvantaged in
the disadvantage condition (M = 2.86, SD = 1.89) than in the
control condition (M = 3.82, SD = 1.69; t(302) = 4.64, p <
.001, d = .54).
Emphasizing relative disadvantage made participants
more likely to choose the charity that was less cost-effective
but tied to more disadvantaged participants. That is, par-
ticipants were more likely to choose END over SCI in the
disadvantage condition (43.04%) compared to the control
condition (25.49%; 휒2(1) = 9.64, p = .002, 휑 = .18). Re-
stricting the analysis to participants who correctly indicated
that SCI was more effective than END (N = 243, 80% of the
sample) yielded the same result (31.15% chose END in the
disadvantage condition vs. 11.57% in the control condition;
휒
2(1) = 12.70, p = .001, 휑 = .23).
5.3 Discussion
Study 1 showed that tying a charity to a more disadvan-
taged country increased its attractiveness as a prosocial tar-
get, even if this implied forgoing impact in terms of lives
saved. This study has the merit of considering a real choice
of which charity to donate to, between one that was more
cost-effective and one that was framed as focusing on dis-
advantaged recipients. However, giving to the latter charity
was not a behavior necessarily inconsistent with consequen-
tialist prescriptions. For example, participants may have
reasoned that disadvantaged countries have scarcer access
to alternative treatments for tropical disease. Donations to-
wards such countries, then, could reflect a consequentialist
assessment of benefit size, rather than partiality towards the
disadvantaged. The following studies examine benevolent
partiality using life-saving scenarios that facilitated control-
ling for consequentialist explanations and achieving higher
internal validity.
6 Study 2A: Compensation-Efficiency
Trade-off
Study 2A conceptually replicates Study 1 using a life-saving
scenario which facilitates ruling out consequentialist expla-
nations of benevolent partiality. That is, we took precautions
to make observed partiality incompatible with a consequen-
tialist approach to the donation problem. Most importantly,
we emphasized that participants’ donation decisions did
not affect socioeconomic conditions and that socioeconomic
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conditions had no bearing on how critical donations were.
Additionally, Study 2A investigates whether, consistent with
our conceptualization, differences in recipients’ socioeco-
nomic status make the choice of how to allocate aid more
difficult to make, even if such differences are, from a con-
sequentialist point of view, irrelevant to the outcome that is
produced. This study was preregistered (https://aspredicted.
org/k6zi5.pdf).
6.1 Method
6.1.1 Participants and Procedure
Participants were 200 adults recruited from Prolific (62%
female, mean age = 35.64, English as first language). The
study used a two-condition between-participants design.
In the study scenario, a sudden outbreak of a new type of
virus threatened the lives of thousands of people in two fic-
tional third-world countries, Sangala and Naruba. A charity
was collecting money to urgently ship antidotes unavailable
in the developing world, and participants were faced with a
choice of whether to ship antidotes to Sangala or to Naruba.
Participants received information about the two donation
projects that included their cost-effectiveness. Similar to Li
et al. (2018), we explained that because of different shipping
costs, the cost-effectiveness of donating to the two projects
was different, and donating $10 towards the Naruba project
would allow saving more people (i.e., 4–6) than donating
towards the Sangala project (i.e., 2–4).
As in Study 1, we manipulated perceived differences in
recipients’ socioeconomic status by varying the description
of the countries that the two projects were targeting. In
a between-participants design we either described Sangala
and Naruba as having a very low Human Development Index
(control condition) or provided socioeconomic information
such that Sangala was more disadvantaged than Naruba (dis-
advantage condition). Critically, donations would save lives
but had no impact on socioeconomic conditions, i.e., the size
of the benefit is not directly affected by disadvantage.
The scenario included several precautions to rule out con-
sequentialist explanations for donations towards the disad-
vantaged, i.e., ensuring that the size of the benefit was also
uncorrelated with disadvantage. We repeatedly emphasized
that both countries would receive help in the future, but
currently had no access to alternative forms of help (e.g.,
“no citizen has immediate access to antidotes independent
of their geographic location or financial situation”). We
also addressed a “strategic” consequentialist reason for why
people might appear to show benevolent partiality, i.e., that
people focus on lives saved and additionally consider how
other donors might choose. If participants believed that the
least cost-effective project is less likely to be supported, they
may choose to donate to such project in an attempt to help
where most help is needed. To rule this out, the scenario
also reported that “so far, the two projects received about the
same amount of money”. The consequentialist prescription,
therefore, is that participants donate to the project that allows
saving more lives, i.e., Naruba.
After reading the scenario, participants were asked to
choose the project that they wanted to donate to, further
emphasizing that the money would not be used to allevi-
ate disadvantage (“Which campaign do you donate your $10
to? That is, where do you want to ship antidotes to?”). To
test whether people feel less certain about their choice when
socioeconomic differences between beneficiaries is empha-
sized, we alsomeasured participants’ perceived conflict. Par-
ticipants answered three statements on a 9-point scale (1 =
not at all difficult/very certain/not at all conflicted to 9 =
very difficult/not at all certain/very conflicted): “How dif-
ficult was it for you to decide between the two projects?”,
“How certain were you about which project to choose?”
(reverse-coded), “How conflicted did you feel while choos-
ing between the two projects?”. Scores on these three items
were averaged (훼 = .86).
6.2 Results
We found that emphasizing the relative disadvantage of
Sangala made participants more likely to choose Sangala
over Naruba, i.e., the project which would save fewer lives
(42.42% in the disadvantage condition vs. 15.84% in the
control condition; 휒2(1) = 15.89, p < .001, 휑 = .28). Fur-
thermore, people found it more difficult to choose between
Sangala and Naruba when the relative socioeconomic disad-
vantage of the recipients was emphasized (Mcontrol = 4.70,
SDcontrol = 2.00, Mdisadvantage = 5.58, SDdisadvantage = 2.17,
t(198) = −2.98, p = .003, d = .42).
6.3 Discussion
The results of Study 2A replicate Study 1 under conditions
that make observed partiality incompatible with consequen-
tialist assessments. We conducted two conceptual replica-
tions of this study in which the prosocial endowment need
not be donated to either project in its entirety. We found
evidence of benevolent partiality (i.e., donations towards the
disadvantaged-focused, less cost-effective option) bothwhen
participants could allocate $10 across projects (rather than
choosing one project) and when participants were given an
option not to donate. We report these studies in the Supple-
mentary Material (Study S1 and Study S2).
Study 2A also illustrates that socioeconomic differences
between alternative recipients makes it more difficult for
choose based on effectiveness. The next study tests more
directly whether distributive justice concerns can explain
people’s choices of which lives to save.
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7 Study 2B: Saving Lives as Compen-
sation
Building on Study 2A, Study 2B tests whether distributive
justice concerns play a role in benevolent partiality. In par-
ticular, we included a measure of whether people construct
saving lives as ameans to correct an undesirable distribution,
and tested whether this measure mediates the effect of so-
cioeconomic disadvantage on preferences for prosocial aid.
This study was preregistered (https://aspredicted.org/et6hf.
pdf).
7.1 Method
7.1.1 Participants and Procedure
Participants were 303 adults recruited from Prolific who did
not participate in the previous study (63.0% female, mean
age = 34.8, English as first language). The study used a
two-condition between-participants design.
As in Study 2A, Study 2B asked participants to read
about the outbreak of a disease in two fictional countries
in the developing world, Sangala and Naruba. In a between-
participants design, we again manipulated perceived socioe-
conomic differences between alternative recipients. In the
disadvantage condition, Sangala was described as having
worse socioeconomic conditions than Naruba, whereas in
the control condition socioeconomic conditions were not
spelled out. After participants read the scenario, they were
askedwhere they preferred to allocate aid (“Which campaign
do you donate your $10 to? That is, where do you want to
ship antidotes to?”). Importantly, as in the previous study,
donating towards Naruba allowed saving more lives (4–6)
compared to donating to Sangala (2–4).
To test whether distributive justice concerns explain
benevolent partiality, we also measured whether people con-
structed their donation as a means towards correcting an un-
fair resource distribution. Participants answered three state-
ments on a scale from 1 (Sangala) to 7 (Naruba): “Donating
to which campaign, if any, would make the third world a
fairer place?”, “Donating to which campaign, if any, would
make the third world a more equal place?”, “Donating to
which campaign, if any, would most reduce inequality?”.
Scores on these three items were averaged (훼 = .83).
7.2 Results
Consistent with the results of previous studies, we found that
emphasizing that Sangala had worse socioeconomic condi-
tions than Naruba made participants more likely to choose
Sangala over Naruba, thus saving fewer lives than they could
(40.79% in the disadvantage condition vs. 20.53% in the
control condition; 휒2(1) = 13.68, p < .001, 휑 = .21). More-
over, a mediation analysis using 10,000 bootstrapped sam-
ples showed that this effect was explained by perceptions that
donating towards Sangala would contribute to reduce unjust
inequality (indirect effect = .44, CI 95% [.24, .73]).
7.3 Discussion
This study complements Study 2A in showing that so-
cioeconomic differences, even when consequentially irrel-
evant in the decision problem, can present people with a
compensation-efficiency trade-off. In particular, the results
of Study 2B indicate that people might construct saving lives
as a means to correct situations that they deem unfair, sac-
rificing efficiency in order to compensate disadvantaged re-
cipients.
8 Study 3: Reflecting on How to Give
Reduces Benevolent Partiality
Study 3 tests how the structure of the task employed in the do-
nation decision affects donors’ preferences for efficiency vs.
compensation in prosocial aid allocation. Normative mod-
els of decision-making recommend approaching decisions
by first evaluating the importance of each dimension of the
problem and then evaluating how available solutions score
on such dimensions (e.g., Bazerman&Moore, 2008). In this
study, we asked how benevolent partiality varies depending
on whether, before donating, people are prompted to reflect
on the relative importance of the number of lives saved and
the socioeconomic situation of the recipients. This study
was preregistered (https://aspredicted.org/k4w7m.pdf).
8.1 Method
8.1.1 Participants and Procedure
Participants were 300 adults recruited from Prolific who did
not participate in previous studies (60.7% female, mean age
= 34.7, English as first language). The study used a two-
condition between-participants design.
Participants went through the same material as the disad-
vantage condition in Study 2A, and made a choice between
donating $10 to save 4–6 lives in Naruba or 2–4 lives in
Sangala, with the latter being slightly more socioeconomi-
cally disadvantaged. In a between-participants design, we
randomly assigned participants to either ranking the impor-
tance of the project attributes or not prior to making their
choice. In particular, half of the participants were asked
“if you had to decide where to ship the antidotes that your
$10 donation would allow buying, how would you go about
that decision? Please rank the five factors below from 1
(the most important factor in my decision) to 5 (the least
important factor in my decision).” We listed five factors in
an order randomized for each participant (i.e., lives saved
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per donation, population of the country, unemployment rate
of the country, literacy rate of the country, average income
in the country). All participants chose between the two do-
nation projects (which were described along the same five
attributes) using the usual wording.
As a further precaution, at the end of the study we asked
participants “What will the collected donation be used for?”
as a comprehension check. To pass the check, participants
had to select only “For buying and shipping antidotes” among
several options.
8.2 Results
Among participants who ranked the importance of the
project attributes prior to their choice, 92% put “lives saved”
as first in the ranking. Most importantly, participants who
first ranked the attributes were less likely to display benev-
olent partiality than participants who did not rank the at-
tributes. That is, participants were less likely to choose San-
gala overNaruba in the ranking first condition (22.97%) com-
pared to participants in the no ranking condition (46.05%;
휒
2(1) = 16.63, p < .001, 휑 = .24). This result did not change
when restricting our analysis to participants who passed the
comprehension check (21.97% selected Sangala in the rank-
ing first condition vs. 43.88% in the no ranking condition;
휒
2(1) = 13.69, p < .001, 휑 = .22).
8.3 Discussion
The results of Study 3 revealed that reflecting beforehand
on how to approach a donation decision makes preferences
more aligned to the consequentialist prescription of saving
more lives. This finding contributes to our understanding of
when benevolent partiality is more and less likely to occur.
9 General Discussion
Across several studies of prosocial aid allocation, we inves-
tigated how people resolve the trade-off between efficiency
(saving as many lives as possible) and compensation (saving
the lives of those who are more socioeconomically disad-
vantaged). We elicited both consequential (Study 1) and
hypothetical (Study 2A, Study 2B, and Study 3) preferences
for alternative ways to donate to a charity — one allowing
to save more people, and one allowing to save fewer peo-
ple from a (slightly) more disadvantaged group. We took
several precautions to rule out the consequentialist reasons
why it often is more sensible to give to those who have the
least. In our typical studies, prosocial aid did not address
socioeconomic disadvantage, but was explicitly directed at
preventing an outcome (death) that could be constructed
as equally aversive irrespective of recipient characteristics.
Further precautions, which we tested with comprehension
checks, clarified that socioeconomic conditions did not cor-
relate with access to help. For these reasons, within our
paradigms, preference for saving fewer lives are difficult to
reconcile with consequentialist assessments of impact. Con-
trary to the prescription of consequentialist philosophy and
the Effective Altruism movement, we found that many peo-
ple display what we termed benevolent partiality: They are
partial, in that they prioritize some lives over others, contra-
dicting the impartiality principle; they do so benevolently,
in that they mean to prioritize those who belong to more
disadvantaged groups.
We suggest that benevolent partiality is driven by people’s
distributive justice concerns, and in particular by people’s
discomfort with resource distributions that are perceived as
inequitable. In support of this interpretation, we found that
socioeconomic differences make the decision harder to take
when compensation and efficiency arguments conflict (Study
2A), and that people construct saving lives as an opportunity
to reduce inequalities that they deem unjust (Study 2B). As a
further validation of this interpretation, we conducted a sep-
arate study (reported in the SupplementaryMaterial as Study
S3) that used the same scenario as Study 2A and Study 2B,
and in which we framed disadvantaged recipients as either
responsible for their socioeconomic circumstances (i.e., they
overharvested crops) or not (i.e., their soil was of poor qual-
ity). Previous research suggests that distributive justice con-
cerns are weaker when disadvantaged people are perceived
as responsible for their situation (e.g., Fong, 2001, Skitka
& Tetlock, 1992). Consistent with benevolent partiality de-
pending on the strength of distributive concerns, we found
that people were less likely to sacrifice cost-effectiveness
when disadvantaged recipients were perceived as responsi-
ble for their disadvantage.
We also found that the prevalence of benevolent partial-
ity depends on how the aid allocation task is structured. In
particular, we prompted people to reflect upon the relative
importance of alternative dimensions of the problem, a rec-
ommended step in prescriptive models of decision-making
(e.g., Bazerman & Moore, 2008). We found that this ad-
ditional step translated into choices that were more aligned
with consequentialist prescriptions to save the largest num-
ber of lives, irrespective of socioeconomic status.
This work contributes to our understanding of the of moral
psychology of altruism, and in particular of the role of dis-
tributive justice concerns in prosocial preferences. Discom-
fort with inequalities can often motivate behaviors that align
with consequentialist prescriptions, such as reducing disad-
vantage (e.g., Alesina&Angeletos, 2005; Frank et al., 2015).
We found that distributive justice concerns also play a role
in decisions that do not directly affect socioeconomic con-
ditions. In particular, distributive justice concerns can make
people more sensitive to the needs of disadvantaged recip-
ients, even if such needs are equal to alternative recipients
in less disadvantaged conditions. As a result, people display
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 15, No. 2, March 2020 Benevolent partiality 180
preferences and behaviors that deviate from the prescriptions
of consequentialist ethics and Effective Altruism.
Our work also informs the psychology of impartiality,
which is one key tenet of utilitarian and, more generally,
consequentialist philosophy (Kahane et al., 2017). Previous
research focused on instances of partiality that depended on
the psychological distance between the actor and the victim.
For example, people are less willing to help unidentified
victims that are more geographically distant (Kogut et al.,
2018), or that are perceived as out-group rather than in-
group members (Levine et al., 2002). One exception is the
work by Goodwin and Landy (2014) showing that the young
are often prioritized over the old in life-and-death decision-
making contexts (which is consistent with attention to life
years rather than lives). Similarly, our research documents
partiality among actors that evaluate equally distant targets
that differ in one moralized characteristic. We hope that our
paper will stimulate more descriptive research on the thorny
issue of how people value the lives of others (e.g., Awad et
al., 2018). Whereas we focused on the role of socioeconomic
disadvantage in the light of its relevance for charity, future
researchmay investigate other determinants of partiality, and
their consequences for how aid is ultimately allocated.
Finally, we believe these results are important for gov-
ernmental agencies and rating organizations that are con-
cerned with quantifying the impact of alternative prosocial
initiatives. Rating models are built upon precise philosoph-
ical prescriptions (e.g., impartiality), and their normative
appropriateness is a long-standing topic in philosophy. Im-
portantly, however, the assumptions in these models may
be more or less aligned with the prosocial preferences of
the users of such models (e.g., potential donors), also de-
pending on the situation (e.g., on whether the donation task
prompts people to reflect on their preferences). The poten-
tial for disagreement suggests the need for rating agencies,
such as GiveWell, to increase even further the transparency
of their consequentialist assumptions. This would result in
choices that are more informed and better aligned with peo-
ple’s philosophical orientations.
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